| Dimension | Standard Economics | Development Economics |
|---|---|---|
| Markets | Assumed to function reasonably well | Markets frequently fail: missing, thin, or severely distorted |
| Information | Broadly symmetric | Severe asymmetries — farmers, borrowers, patients all face information deficits |
| Institutions | Background conditions | Central — weak rule of law, absent land records, no banking access all matter enormously |
| History | Often ignored (steady-state focus) | Path dependence is real: colonial legacies, land reform, caste all shape outcomes today |
| Units of analysis | Rational representative agent | Heterogeneous households, gender, ethnicity, geography, social networks |
| Methods | Theory + aggregate national data | RCTs, household surveys, natural experiments, ethnography, administrative data |
| Policy ambition | Marginal adjustments to allocation | Structural change in institutions, incentives, capabilities, and power relations |
| Poverty Line | Threshold | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| World Bank Extreme | $2.15/day PPP | Global extreme poverty tracking · SDG 1 |
| World Bank Lower-Middle | $3.65/day PPP | LMIC-relevant threshold |
| World Bank Upper-Middle | $6.85/day PPP | Upper-middle income country context |
| India Tendulkar Line | ~₹32/day urban · ₹27/day rural | Access to welfare schemes — widely criticised as too low |
| India Rangarajan Line | ₹47/day urban · ₹32/day rural | Higher 2014 revision, not officially adopted |
| Relative poverty | 50–60% of median income | Rich-country inequality benchmark |
| MPI | Deprived in 3+ of 10 indicators | Non-income multidimensional poverty |
| Indicator | What It Measures | Produced By | Key Limitation |
|---|---|---|---|
| GDP per capita | Average economic output per person | World Bank, IMF | Ignores distribution, unpaid work, environmental costs |
| HDI | Health + Education + Income composite | UNDP | Country averages hide deep within-country regional and gender gaps |
| MPI | Simultaneous deprivations across 10 indicators | UNDP-OPHI | Threshold-dependent; does not capture near-poor or severity well |
| Gini coefficient | Income or wealth distribution | World Bank, WID | Insensitive to who gains/loses at extremes; requires good survey data |
| Genuine savings | Net wealth creation including natural capital depletion | World Bank | Very difficult to price natural assets; contested methodology |
| Subjective wellbeing | Self-reported life satisfaction and happiness | Gallup, World Happiness Report | Cultural and contextual biases in self-reporting; volatile |
| Gender Gap Index | Economic, political, health, education gender parity | WEF | Doesn't capture intra-household inequality; relative, not absolute |
| Instrument | Mechanism | India Programme | Evidence Summary |
|---|---|---|---|
| Food subsidy | Subsidised/free staple foodgrains | NFSA/PDS — 80 crore beneficiaries, 5kg free under PM-GKAY | Reduces caloric poverty; fiscal cost high; JAM trinity reduced leakage significantly |
| Employment guarantee | State as employer of last resort | MGNREGS — 100 days guaranteed at minimum wage, rural | Reduces distress migration; wage floor effects real; mixed productivity outcomes |
| Cash transfers | Direct income support via DBT | PM-KISAN (₹6,000/yr to farmers); women's SHG transfers | Low leakage post-JAM; impact on consumption positive; long-run savings ambiguous |
| Conditional transfers | Cash tied to health/education behaviour | Janani Suraksha Yojana (institutional deliveries); PMMVY | Strong evidence on institutional births; India's evidence weaker than PROGRESA |
| School feeding | Free meals to incentivise attendance | PM-POSHAN (MDM Scheme) — world's largest school feeding programme | Strong evidence on enrolment and nutrition, especially girls; quality variable |
| Health insurance | Public coverage for catastrophic costs | PM-JAY/Ayushman Bharat — ₹5 lakh/family/year hospitalisation | Reduces medical impoverishment; utilisation lower than expected; supply-side gaps persist |
| Dimension | China (post-1978) | India (post-1991) |
|---|---|---|
| Growth engine | Export-led manufacturing; infrastructure investment; FDI into SEZs | Services-led growth; IT/BPO; domestic consumption; limited manufacturing |
| Structural shift | Agriculture (71% employed 1978) → manufacturing → services. Full Lewis transformation. | Agriculture → services, skipping manufacturing. Labour remains in agriculture. |
| Poverty reduction | 800M lifted from $1.90 poverty 1981–2015. Most rapid reduction in history. | Significant but slower. 230M still below $2.15 threshold. |
| State role | Strong developmental state; directed credit; SOE + private sector hybrid; property rights ambiguous | Mixed economy; gradual liberalisation; regulatory complexity; democratic constraints |
| Education & health | Mass primary education pre-1978; bare-feet doctors; strong foundations for growth | Higher education islands of excellence; poor public primary and health systems; underinvestment |
| GDP per capita (PPP, 2022) | ~$17,600 | ~$8,400 |
| Key lesson | Industrial policy, land reform, and strong state capacity preceded and enabled market growth | Market liberalisation without prior human capital and institutional investment limits reach |
| Policy Instrument | Mechanism | Coverage & Scale | Critique |
|---|---|---|---|
| MSP (Min. Support Price) | Government price floor for 23 crops. State procures at MSP through FCI, NAFED etc. | Effective mostly for wheat & rice in Punjab, Haryana, MP. Most small farmers don't access MSP. | Benefits concentrated in irrigated belts; excludes 80%+ of farmers; fiscally costly; distorts crop mix |
| Fertiliser subsidies | Subsidised urea and DAP to reduce input costs | ~₹2 lakh crore/year total. Among world's largest. | Encourages overuse of urea; soil degradation; benefits largest farmers most |
| Free/subsidised power | Agricultural electricity at zero or near-zero cost in several states | Punjab, Telangana, Tamil Nadu, MP etc. | Encourages groundwater overextraction; fiscally unsustainable; distorts water use |
| Crop insurance (PMFBY) | Premium subsidy for crop loss insurance against climate, pest, and market risk | ~25% of cropped area insured; claim settlement slow | Delayed claims; low penetration among marginal farmers; insurance companies dominant |
| PM-KISAN | ₹6,000/year direct cash transfer to landowner farmers | ~110 million farmer families. Landless excluded by design. | Excludes tenant farmers and landless labourers — i.e., the poorest in agriculture |
| Level | Coverage Norm | Key Functions |
|---|---|---|
| Sub-Centre (SC) | 1 per 5,000 pop (plain); 3,000 (hilly) | ANM for MCH, immunisation, basic drugs |
| PHC | 1 per 30,000 pop | OPD, maternity, routine curative care |
| CHC | 1 per 1,20,000 pop | Specialist care, surgery, inpatient |
| Intervention | Evidence | Effect Size | India Application |
|---|---|---|---|
| Early childhood nutrition (1,000 days) | Very strong — randomised and quasi-experimental | 0.3–0.5 SD gain in cognition, +10–20% earnings | ICDS POSHAN — reach wide but quality uneven |
| Teaching at the Right Level (TaRL) | Strong RCT evidence (J-PAL · Pratham) | 0.3–0.7 SD learning gain | Pratham camps, state partnerships in UP, Bihar, Rajasthan |
| School feeding (MDM) | Strong on enrolment and attendance | 5–15pp enrolment increase | PM-POSHAN — world's largest, ~120M children |
| Girls' education incentives | Strong CCT evidence (PROGRESA, Bangladesh stipend) | Large enrolment and retention gains | Kanyashree (WB), Beti Bachao Beti Padhao — mixed results |
| Conditional cash transfers + health | Strong (Mexico PROGRESA, Brazil Bolsa) | Significant on vaccination, antenatal care | JSY for institutional delivery — strong evidence |
| Deworming | Contested — strong on attendance (Kenya), weak on learning | Attendance: strong · Test scores: ambiguous | National Deworming Day — wide reach, cost-effective |
| Micronutrient supplementation | Strong for specific deficiencies (iron, iodine, vitamin A) | Significant reductions in anaemia, night blindness | SABLA, POSHAN — coverage improving, compliance weak |
| Market Failure | Development Context |
|---|---|
| Public goods | Roads, dams, malaria eradication — non-rival, non-excludable. Markets provide too little. State must step in. |
| Externalities | Education, vaccination, sanitation — large positive spillovers. Private investment insufficient without subsidy. |
| Information asymmetry | Credit (adverse selection), insurance (moral hazard), healthcare (diagnosis) — markets break down without regulation. |
| Missing markets | No market for future labour (limits HC investment), no long-term crop insurance, no formal land rental markets in many areas. |
| Coordination failures | Industrial clusters, ports, irrigation — each firm's investment is only profitable if others also invest. State must coordinate. |
| Natural monopoly | Power grids, water systems, railways — high fixed costs make competitive markets inefficient; regulation or public ownership needed. |
| Institution | Founded | Core Mandate | Development Role | Main Critique |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| World Bank (IBRD/IDA) | 1944 | Reduce poverty; long-term development lending | Largest single source of development finance for LMICs; IDA for poorest | Structural adjustment conditionality in 1980s–90s caused harm; governance weighted to rich countries |
| IMF | 1944 | Macro stability; balance of payments support | Emergency lending; surveillance; technical capacity | Austerity conditionality cuts health and education in crises; serial failures in LMICs (Argentina, Greece) |
| WTO | 1995 (GATT 1947) | Rules-based multilateral trade | Reduces trade barriers; dispute settlement; accession commitments | Doha Round collapsed 2001–; TRIPS limits affordable medicines; rich-country farm subsidies persist |
| UN system (UNCTAD, UNDP, WHO, ILO) | 1945– | Normative, technical, humanitarian | HDRs, MDGs/SDGs, ILO labour standards, pandemic response | Weak enforcement; coordination failures; donor-driven priorities can crowd out Southern agency |
| New institutions (NDB, AIIB) | 2014–15 | Infrastructure finance; BRICS-led | Alternative to Bretton Woods conditionality; South-South financing | Still operate within similar credit-rating frameworks; not fundamentally different in practice |
| Method | Logic | Famous Development Example |
|---|---|---|
| Instrumental Variables (IV) | Use exogenous variation (instrument) that affects treatment but not outcome directly | AJR: Settler mortality as IV for institutions → income levels (2001) |
| Difference-in-Differences | Compare change over time in treated vs control groups | Card & Krueger: NJ minimum wage rise vs PA — no job loss found |
| Regression Discontinuity | Compare units just above/below arbitrary eligibility cutoff | Skoufias: PROGRESA — eligible households near score cutoff |
| Matching | Compare treated units with observably similar controls | Propensity score matching for MGNREGS employment effects in India |
| Country | GDP per capita PPP (2022) | HDI Rank | Poverty (nat. line) | Key Development Story |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| India | $8,400 | 134 | ~10% ($2.15/day, 2021) | Services-led growth; democratic federal state; deep inequality; MPI declining |
| Bangladesh | $7,200 | 129 | 18.7% (nat. poverty line) | Garment exports + female LFPR + NGO infrastructure. Surpassed India in several HDI components. |
| Pakistan | $5,900 | 164 | ~35% (nat. line, 2023) | Fiscal-political crisis cycle. Low female LFPR. Debt distress. Agricultural economy with urban bias. |
| Sri Lanka | $14,500 (pre-crisis) | 73 | <5% (pre-crisis) | 2022 crisis erased decades of gains. Tourism + remittances + debt. High HDI but fragile macro. |
| Nepal | $4,100 | 146 | 17.4% (nat. line) | Remittance economy (25%+ of GDP). Post-earthquake recovery. Tourism. Federal transition ongoing. |
| Bhutan | $12,900 | 127 | <10% | Gross National Happiness framework. Hydropower exports to India. Carbon negative. Small scale. |
| Journal | Focus |
|---|---|
| Journal of Development Economics | Core field journal; empirical and theory |
| World Development | Interdisciplinary; social & economic development |
| Journal of Political Economy | Institutional, political economy, labour |
| American Economic Review | Top-5; RCTs, trade, macro |
| Economic & Political Weekly (EPW) | India-focused; policy & applied economics |
| Source | What's Available |
|---|---|
| World Bank WDI | 200+ country development indicators |
| UNDP HDR | HDI, MPI, gender indices |
| MOSPI / NSO India | PLFS, HCES, SRS, India surveys |
| ASER Centre | Annual learning outcomes, rural India |
| Intervention | Cost per Impact Unit | Evidence Source |
|---|---|---|
| Long-lasting insecticide-treated bed nets | $2,000–5,000 per life saved equivalent | GiveWell / RCT evidence |
| Oral rehydration therapy for diarrhoea | $200–400 per DALY averted | Disease Control Priorities |
| Teaching at the Right Level (TaRL) | $4–8 per 0.1 SD learning improvement | J-PAL 2023 review |
| Deworming (school-based) | $0.50–2 per treatment year | Multiple RCTs |
| Unconditional cash transfers | $500–1,500 per beneficiary household | GiveDirectly evidence |
| Cataract surgery | $25–50 per DALY averted (LMICs) | DCP3 |
| Constitutional/Legal Instrument | Development Significance |
|---|---|
| Article 21 (Right to Life) | Expanded by SC to include right to health, education, livelihood, a dignified life |
| DPSP Art. 39(b), 41, 43, 47 | Directive for material security, right to work, living wage, public health — not enforceable but interpretive framework |
| MGNREGA (2005) | Statutory right to 100 days wage employment — first enforceable employment right in India |
| RTE Act (2009) | Free and compulsory education 6–14 as a Fundamental Right |
| Food Security Act (2013) | Legal entitlement to subsidised foodgrains for 67% of population |
| Forest Rights Act (2006) | Recognition of tribal rights over forest land and resources |
| PESA (1996) | Panchayats (Extension to Scheduled Areas) — tribal self-governance rights |
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| GDP | Gross Domestic Product: total market value of goods/services produced in a country in a year |
| PPP | Purchasing Power Parity: exchange rate adjustment for price level differences across countries |
| HDI | Human Development Index: composite of life expectancy, education, and GNI per capita (UNDP) |
| MPI | Multidimensional Poverty Index: simultaneously deprived in 3+ of 10 indicators across health/education/living standards |
| Gini coefficient | Summary measure of income/wealth inequality, 0 (equal) to 1 (fully concentrated) |
| Capabilities approach | Sen: development = expanding what people can be and do, not just their income |
| Poverty trap | Self-reinforcing mechanism where being poor prevents investments needed to escape poverty |
| TFP | Total Factor Productivity: output growth unexplained by capital and labour inputs — driven by technology and efficiency |
| Lewis turning point | Point at which surplus agricultural labour is absorbed by modern sector, driving wage rises |
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| RCT | Randomised Controlled Trial: random assignment to treatment/control to identify causal effects |
| ATE | Average Treatment Effect: mean difference in outcomes between treatment and control groups |
| Moral hazard | Changed behaviour after receiving insurance/credit due to reduced personal risk |
| Adverse selection | High-risk parties disproportionately select into contracts — market failure in credit/insurance |
| Covariate risk | Risk that affects all community members simultaneously (drought, flood) — cannot be pooled locally |
| DALY | Disability-Adjusted Life Year: 1 year of full healthy life lost to disease or disability |
| Endogenous growth | Growth driven by deliberate investment in knowledge and human capital (Romer, Lucas) |
| Washington Consensus | 10-point IMF/WB reform package of the 1980s–90s: liberalisation, privatisation, fiscal discipline |
| Institutional economics | Focus on rules, norms, and organisations as determinants of economic outcomes (North, AJR) |