| Kind | Example question | What answers it |
|---|---|---|
| Descriptive | What share of births in Bihar happen in a health facility? | A good sample survey such as NFHS, with weights |
| Predictive | Which blocks are likely to report the most malnourished children next year? | A model that fits past data well; it need not explain anything |
| Causal | Did a cash incentive to mothers raise facility births, and by how much? | A comparison that stands in for the births that would have happened without the incentive |
| Causal, at scale | Would the same incentive work if every state ran it through its own health department? | Causal evidence plus an argument about context and implementation |
| Woman | Took course? | Y(1): earnings if trained | Y(0): earnings if not | Individual effect | What we observe |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Asha | Yes | ₹6,000 | ₹5,000 | +₹1,000 | ₹6,000 |
| Bina | Yes | ₹7,000 | ₹6,500 | +₹500 | ₹7,000 |
| Chandni | Yes | ₹5,500 | ₹4,000 | +₹1,500 | ₹5,500 |
| Devi | No | ₹3,500 | ₹2,500 | +₹1,000 | ₹2,500 |
| Esha | No | ₹3,000 | ₹2,000 | +₹1,000 | ₹2,000 |
| Estimand | Plain meaning | Policy question it answers |
|---|---|---|
| ATE: average treatment effect | Average of Y(1) minus Y(0) over everyone in the population | What if we gave it to everybody? |
| ATT: average effect on the treated | Average effect among those who actually received it | Was it worth it for the people who got it? |
| ATU: average effect on the untreated | Average effect among those who did not receive it | What would expansion to the rest achieve? |
| ITT: intention to treat | Effect of being offered or assigned, whether or not the unit took it up | What does announcing the programme achieve, given real take-up? |
| LATE: local average treatment effect | Average effect among units whose take-up was changed by the offer or instrument | What does it do for people who respond to the nudge? |
| Confounder linked to treatment | Confounder linked to outcome | Bias in naive estimate | Example (Illustrative) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Positively | Positively | Upward, effect overstated | Motivated farmers adopt drip irrigation and also manage crops better |
| Positively | Negatively | Downward, effect understated | Sicker patients are more likely to get the new drug and more likely to die |
| Negatively | Positively | Downward, effect understated | Richer households are less likely to use a ration shop and have better nutrition |
| Negatively | Negatively | Upward, effect overstated | Remote villages get fewer schools and also have lower learning for other reasons |
| Shape | Arrows | Name of middle variable | Adjust for it? |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fork | T ← Z → Y | Confounder | Yes: it opens a non-causal path |
| Chain | T → M → Y | Mediator | No, if you want the total effect of T |
| Collider | T → K ← Y | Collider | No: adjusting opens a false path |
| Baseline characteristic | Treatment (60 schools) | Control (60 schools) | Difference | p-value |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Grade 3 reading score (standardised) | 0.02 | −0.01 | 0.03 | 0.71 |
| Pupils enrolled per school | 142 | 138 | 4 | 0.64 |
| Share of pupils from SC or ST households | 0.31 | 0.34 | −0.03 | 0.42 |
| Teacher attendance on unannounced visit | 0.78 | 0.76 | 0.02 | 0.58 |
| Distance to block headquarters (km) | 14.1 | 12.9 | 1.2 | 0.33 |
| Unit randomised | When it fits | Cost to the study |
|---|---|---|
| Individual | Treatment delivered person by person with little spillover: a scholarship, an SMS reminder | Cheapest in sample size; spillovers inside households or villages contaminate the control |
| Household | Transfers, asset grants, counselling | Effects on neighbours still possible |
| School or clinic | Anything a whole institution delivers: a teaching method, staffing | Outcomes within a school are correlated, so more pupils add less information |
| Village or ward | Infrastructure, community mobilisation, local markets | Need many villages; tens are rarely enough |
| Block, district or subdistrict | Administrative reforms rolled out by government | Few units, so power is low unless the effect is large |
| Threat | What happens | Defence |
|---|---|---|
| Non-compliance | Some assigned units refuse; some control units find the treatment elsewhere | Report intention to treat; estimate effect on compliers by IV (Section 8) |
| Attrition | Units lost at follow-up differ by arm | Track hard; report rates by arm; bound the estimate |
| Spillovers | Control units are affected by treated neighbours | Randomise larger clusters; measure spillovers with buffer or partial-treatment designs |
| Hawthorne and John Henry effects | Treated units change because they are observed; controls compete | Measure outcomes unobtrusively; give controls a placebo contact |
| Specification searching | Many outcomes and subgroups tested, the significant ones reported | Pre-register; write a pre-analysis plan; adjust for multiple outcomes |
| Implementation failure | The treatment was not delivered as designed | Monitor delivery; report what was actually delivered |
| 2023 (before) | 2025 (after) | Change | |
|---|---|---|---|
| District A (bus) | 71% | 82% | +11 points |
| District B (no bus) | 64% | 70% | +6 points |
| Difference A minus B | 7 points | 12 points | +5 points |
| Paper | Main point | Where |
|---|---|---|
| Goodman-Bacon (2021) | The two-way fixed effects estimate is a weighted average of all two-by-two DiDs, including early-versus-late comparisons | Journal of Econometrics 225(2): 254–277 |
| de Chaisemartin & D'Haultfœuille (2020) | Weights can be negative; the coefficient can be negative while every group's effect is positive | American Economic Review 110(9): 2964–2996 |
| Callaway & Sant'Anna (2021) | Estimate effects for each adoption cohort and period, then aggregate as you choose | Journal of Econometrics 225(2): 200–230 |
| Sun & Abraham (2021) | Event-study leads and lags are contaminated in the same way; an interaction-weighted fix | Journal of Econometrics 225(2): 175–199 |
| Sharp RD | Fuzzy RD | |
|---|---|---|
| Rule | Everyone above the cutoff is treated; no one below is | Crossing the cutoff raises the chance of treatment but not from 0 to 1 |
| Example (Illustrative) | A scholarship paid automatically to every student scoring 80% or more | A road programme that prioritises villages above a population size, though some below get roads and some above do not |
| Estimate | Jump in outcome at the cutoff | Jump in outcome divided by jump in treatment probability |
| Who it describes | Units at the cutoff | Units at the cutoff whose treatment was changed by the rule (compliers) |
| Close cousin | A simple comparison of means near the line | Instrumental variables, with the cutoff as instrument |
| Condition | In plain words | Can you test it? |
|---|---|---|
| Relevance | The instrument changes the treatment, substantially | Yes: look at the first stage and its F-statistic |
| Independence | The instrument is as good as randomly assigned, unrelated to anything else that affects the outcome | Partly: check balance on observed characteristics |
| Exclusion restriction | The instrument affects the outcome only through the treatment, by no other route | No: it must be argued from knowledge of the setting |
| Monotonicity | The instrument pushes everyone the same way (no one is less likely to take the treatment because of it) | Rarely; argued from the setting |
| Type | If offered | If not offered | In a lottery for tuition places (Illustrative) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Always-takers | Treated | Treated | Would have paid for similar classes anyway |
| Never-takers | Untreated | Untreated | Would not attend even if free |
| Compliers | Treated | Untreated | Attend only when the place is free; the LATE is their effect |
| Defiers | Untreated | Treated | Assumed not to exist (monotonicity) |
| Diagnostic | What good looks like | What it reveals if poor |
|---|---|---|
| Overlap of propensity scores | Both groups spread across the same range | The comparison rests on a few untreated units or on extrapolation |
| Standardised differences after matching | Below about 0.1 for each characteristic | Matching did not balance what it was meant to |
| Number of units discarded | Reported, with who they were | The estimate describes a subgroup the reader did not expect |
| Sensitivity analysis | How strong an unobserved confounder would have to be to erase the effect | Fragile results that a modest omitted factor would overturn |
| Lim et al., Lancet 2010 | Powell-Jackson et al., J. Health Econ. 2015 | |
|---|---|---|
| Variation used | Individual women: who did and did not receive JSY payment | Districts: differences in how intensively JSY was implemented |
| Main design | Matching of women who received JSY payment to similar women who did not; also with-versus-without and DiD | Difference-in-differences on how intensively districts implemented JSY |
| Comparison | Similar women in the same period who did not receive payment | Districts with lower implementation, before and after |
| Assumption that must hold | Receiving payment is as good as random among women with the same observed characteristics | High- and low-implementation districts would have had parallel trends |
| Use of maternity care | Antenatal care and facility births increased | Uptake of maternity services increased |
| Neonatal mortality | Reduction of 2.3 per 1,000 live births (matching) | No strong evidence of a reduction |
| Study | Average finding | What the split revealed |
|---|---|---|
| Cash and capital grants to microenterprises, Sri Lanka (de Mel, McKenzie & Woodruff, QJE 2008) | High average returns to capital, above market interest rates | Returns varied with ability and household wealth; no positive return in enterprises owned by women |
| Mindspark, urban India (Muralidharan, Singh & Ganimian, AER 2019) | 0.37 SD in maths | Similar absolute gains for all pupils; much larger relative gains for academically weaker pupils |
| Report cards, Pakistan (Andrabi, Das & Khwaja, AER 2017) | Scores up 0.11 SD, fees down 17% | Effects differed by schools' initial scores, consistent with better information |
| Balsakhi, Vadodara and Mumbai (Banerjee et al., QJE 2007) | 0.28 SD | Most of the gain among children at the bottom of the distribution |
| # | Question | A good answer looks like |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | What exactly is the claimed effect, on what outcome, of what treatment? | A number with units, a time period and a defined treatment |
| 2 | Compared with whom? | A named comparison group and the reason it is credible |
| 3 | Who decided who was treated, and how? | A lottery, a rule or a rollout schedule nobody could game |
| 4 | What is the key assumption, in one sentence? | Parallel trends, no sorting at the cutoff, an exclusion restriction, stated plainly |
| 5 | What evidence supports that assumption? | Pre-trends, balance tables, density tests, placebo results |
| 6 | Which effect: offer or receipt, average or for compliers? | ITT, ATT or LATE named |
| 7 | Were outcomes and analysis fixed in advance? | A registration and pre-analysis plan |
| 8 | How many were lost, and from which group? | Attrition by arm, with bounds if it differs |
| 9 | Who ran it, where, and when? | Implementer, setting and dates |
| 10 | Do other studies with different designs agree? | Citations to replications or a systematic review |
| Your situation | Design to consider | Assumption you will have to defend |
|---|---|---|
| Programme not yet started; more demand than places | Randomised lottery or randomised phase-in | Little beyond good implementation and low attrition |
| Eligibility decided by a score with a cutoff | Regression discontinuity | No manipulation of the score; nothing else changes at the cutoff |
| Rolled out to some areas first, with data before and after | Difference-in-differences (with a staggered-timing estimator if rollout was staggered) | Parallel trends between early and late areas |
| Offer is random but take-up is voluntary | Intention to treat, then IV for the effect of take-up | Exclusion: the offer matters only through take-up |
| One state or district treated, many untreated, long pre-period | Synthetic control | A close pre-treatment fit and no shocks unique to the treated unit |
| Selection decided by a known, recorded checklist | Matching or weighting on that checklist | No unrecorded reasons for participation |
| None of the above, only participants' data | Describe outcomes; do not claim an effect | None, because no effect is claimed |
| 2024 (before) | 2026 (after) | Change | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Districts randomly assigned to join in 2026 | 58% | 67% | +9 points |
| Districts randomly assigned to join in 2027 | 57% | 61% | +4 points |
| Difference-in-differences | +5 points | ||
| Same comparison for boys | 62% → 66% | 61% → 65% | 0 points |
| Change | Date in force | Why it complicates causal claims |
|---|---|---|
| Four Labour Codes (Wages; Industrial Relations; Social Security; Occupational Safety, Health and Working Conditions) | 21 November 2025 | Definitions of wages, workers and establishments change, so administrative series may break |
| Income-tax Act 2025 replaces the Income-tax Act 1961 | 1 April 2026 | Tax data before and after follow different statutory definitions |
| Viksit Bharat G RAM G Act 2025 replaces MGNREGA 2005 (125 days) | 1 July 2026 | Rural employment and wage outcomes change for reasons beyond any one programme |
| Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023, with the DPDP Rules 2025 | Board from 13 November 2025; duties and the s17(2)(b) exemption from 13 May 2027 | Changes what data evaluators can collect and how; research exemption under s17(2)(b) on conditions |
| Census of India, reference date 1 March 2027, including caste enumeration | Upcoming | New baseline counts for sampling frames and running variables in future designs |
| Term | Meaning |
|---|---|
| Counterfactual | The outcome that would have occurred without the treatment, for the same units at the same time |
| Selection bias | The difference between groups that would exist even with no treatment |
| Confounder / mediator / collider | A common cause / a step on the causal path / a common effect |
| ITT / ATT / ATE / LATE | Effect of the offer / on the treated / on everyone / on compliers |
| Parallel trends | DiD assumption that treated and comparison groups would have moved together |
| Running variable | The score that decides treatment in an RD design |
| Exclusion restriction | IV assumption that the instrument affects the outcome only through the treatment |
| Common support | The range where treated and untreated units with similar characteristics both exist |
| Donor pool | Untreated units from which a synthetic control is built |
| External validity | Whether an effect holds in other places, times, implementers or scales |
| Pre-analysis plan | A document fixing outcomes and analysis before data are seen |
| Resource | Why read it | Access |
|---|---|---|
| Angrist and Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econometrics (Princeton University Press, 2009) | The economist's toolkit for randomisation, regression, IV, DiD and RD | Book |
| Cunningham, Causal Inference: The Mixtape (Yale University Press, 2021) | Readable, with code in R and Stata, including the newer DiD estimators | Free online at mixtape.scunning.com |
| Huntington-Klein, The Effect: An Introduction to Research Design and Causality (2021) | Built around causal diagrams; good for non-economists | Free online at theeffectbook.net |
| Hernán and Robins, Causal Inference: What If | Potential outcomes and diagrams from epidemiology | Free at miguelhernan.org/whatifbook |
| Gertler, Martinez, Premand, Rawlings and Vermeersch, Impact Evaluation in Practice, 2nd edition (World Bank) | Practical guide for programme managers, with design chapters | Free from the World Bank Open Knowledge Repository |
| DAGitty | Draw a diagram and get the adjustment sets | Free at dagitty.net |