| Form | What it does | Indian example |
|---|---|---|
| Act of Parliament | Creates rights, duties and institutions; binding | VB-G RAM G Act 2025, s5: 125 days of guaranteed work a year |
| Rules under an Act | Detail made by the executive under a power in the Act | Plastic Waste Management Amendment Rules 2021 (notified 12 August 2021) |
| Scheme | A plan of spending and delivery, often made under an Act | Each State must notify a Scheme within six months (VB-G RAM G Act, s3) |
| Executive resolution | Creates bodies or policies without a statute | Cabinet resolution constituting NITI Aayog, 1 January 2015 |
| Court order | Directs the state to act on a right | Supreme Court order of 28 November 2001 on cooked midday meals |
| Actor | Main lever | Example in this course |
|---|---|---|
| Union Cabinet and ministries | Drafts laws, rules, schemes and budgets | Transaction of Business Rules 1961, rule 4 consultations |
| Parliament and its committees | Passes laws, scrutinises bills and budgets | 16% of bills referred to committees in the 17th Lok Sabha |
| State governments | Legislate on State List subjects; implement most schemes | States notify the VB-G RAM G Scheme and pay 40% (60:40 States) |
| Courts | Interpret rights; issue directions in PILs | PUCL v Union of India, cooked midday meals (2001) |
| Frontline officials | Exercise discretion in delivery | Lipsky's street-level bureaucrats |
| Who must be consulted | On what (rule 4) | Why it matters for design |
|---|---|---|
| Any department affected | Cases that concern more than one department (4(1)) | Overlapping mandates must be settled first |
| Ministry of Finance | Orders with a financial bearing, new spending, posts (4(2)) | Cost and fiscal space shape what survives |
| Ministry of Law | Proposals for legislation; general rules and orders (4(3)) | Legal form and constitutional fit |
| Department of Personnel and Training | Recruitment and service conditions (4(4)) | Staffing rules for new bodies |
| Ministry of External Affairs | Matters affecting external relations (4(5)) | Treaty and foreign aid implications |
| Stage | What happened | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Earlier policy | NREGA 2005 guaranteed at least 100 days a year (s3) | National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 2005 (No. 42 of 2005) |
| Adoption | VB-G RAM G Act enacted, Act No. 36 of 2025, dated 20 December 2025 | VB-G RAM G Act 2025 (Act No. 36 of 2025) |
| Commencement | Ministry of Rural Development notification S.O. 2382(E) of 11 May 2026: in force from 1 July 2026 | VB-G RAM G Act 2025 (Act No. 36 of 2025), India Code footnote |
| Repeal | MGNREGA repealed from the appointed date, with savings for past acts (s37) | VB-G RAM G Act 2025 (Act No. 36 of 2025) |
| Implementation | States to notify Schemes within six months (s3) | VB-G RAM G Act 2025 (Act No. 36 of 2025) |
| Evaluation | Too early for evidence on outcomes as of October 2026 | None yet |
| Budget line (Illustrative) | Last year (Rs crore) | This year (Rs crore) | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scheme A, established | 1,000 | 1,060 | +6% |
| Scheme B, established | 400 | 420 | +5% |
| Scheme C, new pilot | 0 | 25 | new |
| Scheme D, under review | 300 | 300 | 0% |
| Stream | 1991 (documented facts) | How it fits the framework |
|---|---|---|
| Problem | Reserves of about Rs 2,500 crore would finance imports for a mere fortnight (Budget speech, 24 July 1991); the RBI pledged gold with the Bank of England to raise loans | A visible crisis made the problem impossible to ignore |
| Policy | Proposals to dismantle industrial licensing and open sectors to foreign investment | Ideas debated for years were ready to use |
| Politics | A government barely a month in office; exchange rate adjustments on 1 and 3 July 1991 were the first steps | A short window in which major change was acceptable |
| Theory | Explains well | Misses | Question for practitioners |
|---|---|---|---|
| Policy cycle | The sequence of official tasks | Power, timing, overlap | Which stage is this policy at? |
| Incrementalism (Lindblom 1959) | Stability and small adjustments | Large, rapid change | What small change could gain agreement? |
| Multiple streams (Kingdon 1984) | Why issues suddenly reach the agenda | Implementation; non-individual actors | Is a solution ready for the next window? |
| Punctuated equilibrium (1993) | Long stability broken by bursts | Exact timing | Who controls the issue's image and venue? |
| Resource | Hood's meaning | South Asian example |
|---|---|---|
| Nodality | Being at the centre of information networks | Public campaigns such as Give It Up for the LPG subsidy |
| Authority | Legitimate power to command or prohibit | Ban on identified single-use plastic items from 1 July 2022 |
| Treasure | Money or exchangeable assets | Direct benefit transfers; BISP cash transfers in Pakistan |
| Organisation | People, buildings, equipment the state controls | Ration shops, anganwadi centres, public schools |
| Furthest level reached | Indian examples in the Survey's Figure 2 | What the state does |
|---|---|---|
| Laissez faire | Give It Up | Leaves the choice to the person, with an appeal |
| Nudge | Aadhaar and Jan Dhan Yojana (part way); Beti Bachao, Beti Padhao; Swachh Bharat Mission | Changes how a choice is presented or what is seen as normal |
| Incentivise | Taxes on tobacco (part way) | Changes the price or payoff of a choice |
| Mandate | Compulsory voting in panchayat elections in some states (part way); alcohol bans in some states | Requires or forbids the behaviour |
| If the cause is mainly... | Consider | Main risk to plan for |
|---|---|---|
| Lack of money in poor households | Cash or in-kind transfers | Exclusion errors in targeting |
| Harm imposed on others | Regulation, taxes | Weak enforcement; evasion |
| People lack information | Information, labelling, campaigns | Message ignored or distrusted |
| Inertia or forgetting | Defaults, reminders (nudges) | Small effects; silent exclusion |
| No provider exists | Public provision or contracting (organisation) | Staffing and absence (Section 6) |
| Providers do not perform | Monitoring, incentives, accountability | Gaming of the measured indicator |
| Selected Second Schedule cases (must go to Cabinet) | Why it matters for policy |
|---|---|
| Cases involving legislation, including Ordinances | Every government bill is a Cabinet decision first |
| Proposals to appoint public commissions or committees of inquiry, and their reports | Commissions are a common way to defer or prepare reform |
| Negotiations with other countries on treaties and important agreements | International commitments that later need domestic law |
| Proclamations of emergency under Articles 352 to 360 | Exceptional powers |
| Subject | List and entry | What it means in practice |
|---|---|---|
| Police | State List, entry 2 | Law and order is a state responsibility |
| Public health and sanitation; hospitals | State List, entry 6 | States run most public health services |
| Agriculture | State List, entry 14 | Farm policy needs state action |
| Education | Concurrent List, entry 25 (since 1976) | Both Union and states legislate |
| Social security and social insurance; employment and unemployment | Concurrent List, entry 23 | Basis for shared employment and welfare law |
| Coping routine (Illustrative) | How it looks on the ground | Effect on the policy |
|---|---|---|
| Rationing by queue | Applications accepted only one morning a week | Workers with daily wages cannot apply |
| Creaming | Easiest cases processed first to meet a monthly target | Hardest-to-reach families wait longest |
| Referral | Difficult cases sent to the block office | Citizen must travel and may give up |
| Paperwork as gatekeeping | Extra documents requested beyond the rules | Entitlement turns into a privilege |
| Delivers better when... | Delivers worse when... |
|---|---|
| Outcomes are macroeconomic | Outcomes are microeconomic |
| Delivery is episodic, with an in-built exit | Delivery and accountability are daily |
| Little depends on local state capacity | Local capacity carries the load |
| Social hierarchy and status matter less | Norms of hierarchy remain strong |
| Kind of evidence | Answers best | Watch for |
|---|---|---|
| Randomised and quasi-experimental evaluations | Did the policy cause the change? | Whether results travel to other places and scales |
| Administrative data (MIS, payment records) | Who was reached, when, at what cost? | Records that reward reporting over reality |
| Surveys (NSS, NFHS, PLFS) | How common is the problem, and for whom? | Timing; survey changes between rounds |
| Qualitative and participatory research | Why and how did it work or fail? | Generalising from a few sites |
| Audits and social audits | Was money spent as claimed? | Follow-up on findings |
| Claim in the PIB note | Question an analyst should ask |
|---|---|
| Rs 3.48 lakh crore cumulative savings | How is a "saving" defined, and against what counterfactual? |
| Rs 1.85 lakh crore of it from food subsidies (PDS) | Were deleted ration cards ineligible, duplicate, or eligible people excluded? |
| Rs 22,106 crore saved by deleting 2.1 crore PM-KISAN beneficiaries | Were deletions verified, and could people appeal? |
| Beneficiary coverage up from 11 crore to 176 crore | Are these people, accounts or transactions? |
| Feature | NREGA 2005 | VB-G RAM G Act 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Days guaranteed per household per year | At least 100 (s3) | At least 125 (s5) |
| Unskilled wage cost | Union pays in full (s22(1)(a)) | Shared 60:40 or 90:10 within a normative allocation (s22) |
| Spending above allocation | No state allocation cap in the Act | Borne by the state (s4(6), s22(5)) |
| Planning of works | Gram Panchayat works under the Scheme | Viksit Gram Panchayat Plans linked to PM Gati Shakti (s4) |
| Seasonal pause | None in the Act | 60 days a year in aggregate, notified by states (s6) |
| Unemployment allowance | If no work within 15 days; paid by state (s7, s22(2)) | If no work within 15 days; borne by state (s11, s22(8)) |
| Study or claim | Setting | Finding |
|---|---|---|
| Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar (AER 2016) | Andhra Pradesh, NREGS and pensions | Faster, less corrupt payments; access did not fall |
| Banerjee et al. (AEJ Applied 2020) | Workfare fund flows, national scale-up | Expenditure down 19–24%; payment delays up |
| Muralidharan, Niehaus and Sukhtankar (NBER WP 26744) | Jharkhand PDS | Corruption fell; 1.5–2 million eligible people lost access at some point |
| PIB / BlueKraft assessment (April 2025) | All DBT schemes | Rs 3.48 lakh crore cumulative savings claimed |
| Lesson | Seen in | Design question |
|---|---|---|
| Who pays shapes who provides | NREGA 2005 and VB-G RAM G 2025 funding rules | Does the funding rule reward meeting demand? |
| Targeting is political | BISP's move from legislators' forms to a scorecard | Who identifies beneficiaries, and who checks them? |
| Technology helps or harms by design | Andhra Pradesh smartcards; Jharkhand PDS | What happens when authentication fails? |
| Opaque formulas exclude quietly | Aswesuma appraisal | Can a household see and appeal its score? |
| Courts can set floors, states deliver | Midday meal orders, 2001 and 2003 | Who has the budget and staff to comply? |
| Policy change (Illustrative) | Concentrated side | Diffuse side | Likely politics |
|---|---|---|---|
| Removing an untargeted fuel subsidy | Current users who lose a visible benefit | Taxpayers who save a little each | Hard; often phased or paired with a transfer |
| Banning a polluting product | Manufacturers and their workers | Residents with cleaner surroundings | Needs time, alternatives and enforcement |
| Biometric checks at ration shops | Dealers who lose diversion income | Taxpayers and eligible households | Dealers resist; exclusion risk falls on the poor |
| Test | Question | Evidence to gather |
|---|---|---|
| Technical | Will it work if implemented as designed? | Evaluations, pilots, theory of change |
| Political | Can it be adopted and survive a change of government? | Stakeholder map; positions of parties and states |
| Administrative | Can the existing state machinery deliver it? | Staff numbers, workload, IT systems, absence data |
| Financial | Can it be paid for, now and in five years? | Cost estimates; Finance Ministry view; fiscal rules |
| Option (Illustrative) | Reduces exclusion | Controls leakage | Cost | Feasible now |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Status quo | 1 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| One-time password to registered mobile as fallback | 2 | 2 | 3 | 2 |
| Nominated family member can authenticate | 2 | 2 | 3 | 3 |
| Manual override logged by dealer, audited monthly | 3 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
| Combine nominee and audited override | 3 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Stage | Formal route | What to submit |
|---|---|---|
| Agenda setting | Petitions, representations, media, research reports | Evidence of the problem's size and who it hurts |
| Formulation | Comments on drafts under the 2014 consultation policy (30 days) | Clause-specific comments with reasons and alternatives |
| Legislative scrutiny | Submissions to the parliamentary committee examining a bill | Short memo; offer to give oral evidence |
| Implementation | RTI requests; grievance systems; social audits | Specific facts and records |
| Review | Evaluation studies; PILs where rights are breached | Evidence of outcomes |
| If the main risk is... | Monitor | Source of data | Early warning sign |
|---|---|---|---|
| Exclusion of eligible people | Rejections, failed authentications, appeals | MIS, grievance logs, household survey | Rising rejections in one block |
| Leakage or ghost beneficiaries | Payments against verified beneficiaries | Payment records, audit samples | Payments to unverified accounts |
| Delayed payments | Days from work or claim to credit | Payment system data | Median delay above the legal limit |
| Frontline overload | Cases per official; vacancies | Staffing records, time-use | Vacancy rate rising with caseload |
| Allocation below demand | Work or benefit demanded against provided | MIS demand registers, field checks | Unrecorded demand reported in the field |