A plain-English guide to the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. Both apply to any organisation that works with children. The POCSO duty to report binds every person who learns of an offence, whether or not they are on the staff.
Section 01
Why safeguarding is a legal duty
Most development organisations meet children somewhere: in schools, anganwadi support, shelters, sports programmes, digital literacy camps, or simply in the communities where they work. Two statutes make child safety a binding legal obligation: the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences (POCSO) Act, 2012 and the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.
The single most important thing to internalise: POCSO's reporting duty is universal and personal. Any person (a teacher, field worker, driver, accountant or volunteer, for example) who knows that an offence under the Act has been committed, or fears that one is likely to be committed, must tell the Special Juvenile Police Unit or the local police (section 19(1)). The organisation cannot handle the matter internally, and an individual cannot pass the duty to HR. Failing to report is punishable with imprisonment of up to six months, a fine, or both (section 21(1)). A person in charge of a company or institution who fails to report an offence in respect of a subordinate under their control faces imprisonment of up to one year and a fine (section 21(2)). Section 21(1) does not apply to a child (section 21(3)).
Section 05
Grey areas that practitioners argue about
Adolescent consensual relationships
Because POCSO has no close-in-age exception, consensual relationships between adolescents, or between a 19-year-old and a 17-year-old, are offences that staff are legally bound to report. Health workers fear this damages adolescents' access to sexual and reproductive health services. In its judgment of 23 May 2025 in In re: Right to Privacy of Adolescents, the Supreme Court restored the conviction in the case before it and used its power under Article 142 of the Constitution to direct that the accused would not undergo the sentence. The Law Commission of India, in Report No. 283 of 27 September 2023, advised against changing the age of consent from 18 and proposed guided judicial discretion in sentencing where a child aged 16 to 18 gave tacit approval in fact though not consent in law. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Anurudh (9 January 2026, 2026 INSC 47), the Supreme Court directed that a copy of its judgment go to the Union Law Secretary to consider steps including a Romeo-Juliet clause exempting consensual adolescent relationships. The Act itself still has no such exception, so the reporting duty stands. Organisations should take specific legal advice on their sexual and reproductive health programme design instead of simply not reporting and saying nothing.
Photographs, fundraising, and "positive" stories
Donor communications love children's faces. But identification prohibitions are strict for children in protection contexts, and even outside them, consent taken from a parent for "programme documentation" rarely covers global fundraising use. The emerging good practice is to show no identifiable face without specific consent that the parent can withdraw, and none at all in protection cases. This is stricter than what much of the sector still does.
What exactly triggers the reporting duty?
The duty attaches on knowledge or apprehension, and proof is not required. A child's disclosure, a credible pattern or a colleague's alarming conduct can each be enough. A person who gives information in good faith under section 19(1) incurs no civil or criminal liability (section 19(7)). A false complaint or false information about an offence under sections 3, 5, 7 or 9, given solely to humiliate, extort, threaten or defame someone, is punishable with imprisonment of up to six months, a fine, or both (section 22(1)), and a child is never punished for it (section 22(2)). The rule that holds up under audit is to report when in doubt and record why.
Children of participants, not participants themselves
A livelihoods or SHG programme "doesn't work with children", until a member's child discloses abuse to your field worker. The POCSO duty applies to your staff anyway. Safeguarding should cover everyone your staff meet, whatever the programme was designed to do.
Judgments that shaped this law
The judgments below are the ones that changed what this law requires in practice. Summaries are editorial orientation, not legal advice; the linked judgment is what is authoritative.
Just Rights for Children Alliance v. S. Harish
Supreme Court of India · 23 September, 2024 · still good law
Held. The Court set aside the Madras High Court order that had quashed proceedings against a man accused of storing child pornography, and restored the case before the Sessions Court. It held that section 15 of the POCSO Act punishes three distinct kinds of storage or possession, in sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), and that viewing such material over the internet without physically storing it can amount to possession under section 15 where the person exercised an invariable degree of control over it. It suggested that Parliament substitute the term 'child sexual exploitation and abuse material' (CSEAM) for 'child pornography' in POCSO, and put courts on notice that the term 'child pornography' shall not be used in any judicial order or judgment.
What changed. Programme documents and training material can use the term CSEAM, which the Court directed courts to use in place of 'child pornography'. The Court read section 67B of the IT Act as punishing the creation, possession, propagation and consumption of such material online, as well as its electronic dissemination.
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Attorney General for India v. Satish
Supreme Court of India · 18 November, 2021 · still good law
Held. The Court quashed the two judgments of the Bombay High Court (Nagpur Bench) that required skin-to-skin contact for sexual assault under section 7 of the POCSO Act, and restored the Special Court judgments. It held that the prosecution was not required to prove skin-to-skin contact to prove the charge of sexual assault under section 7.
What changed. Child protection training and casework can state that sexual assault under section 7 of the POCSO Act does not depend on skin-to-skin contact. Material that teaches the High Court's reading is out of date.
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Sampurna Behura v. Union of India
Supreme Court of India · 9 February, 2018 · still good law
Held. On 9 February 2018 the Supreme Court gave sixteen directions on implementing the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, and disposed of the petition. They include that State Governments must fill Juvenile Justice Board and Child Welfare Committee positions expeditiously, that those bodies must sit regularly, that NCPCR and the State commissions must study how many Probation Officers are needed so that States can appoint them, and that Special Juvenile Police Units must be set up at the earliest as meaningful working units. The Court asked the Chief Justice of each High Court to register a case on its own motion on implementation, and directed the Registry to list the matter on 13 March 2018 for directions after the High Courts' responses.
What changed. A State that leaves Child Welfare Committee or Juvenile Justice Board positions vacant is acting against a direction that the State Governments 'must' fill them expeditiously. Other directions are phrased as advice, such as registering Child Care Institutions and appointing civil society Visitors ('would be well advised'), and carry less force than the 'must' directions. The judgment can be cited when pressing a State to staff these bodies.
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Nipun Saxena v. Union of India
Supreme Court of India · 11 December, 2018 · still good law
Held. The Court held that no person can print or publish, in print, electronic or social media, the name of a victim of a sexual offence or disclose facts that could lead to her being identified. It directed that FIRs for offences under sections 376, 376A, 376AB, 376B, 376C, 376D, 376DA, 376DB and 376E of the IPC and under POCSO are not to be put in the public domain, and that police keep documents naming the victim in a sealed cover where possible and replace them with versions that omit the name. Where the victim is dead or of unsound mind, disclosure of identity is decided by the competent authority (at the time, the Sessions Judge), and for a minor victim under POCSO only the Special Court can permit it, if that is in the interest of the child. The Court requested States and Union Territories to set up at least one one-stop centre in every district within one year.
What changed. Anyone who documents or publishes casework has to keep a survivor of a sexual offence unidentifiable in any medium, including a case study, photograph, grant report or social media post. Section 228A of the IPC, which the judgment applies, has been replaced by section 72 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita 2023, in force from 1 July 2024; section 72 covers offences under sections 64 to 71 of the Sanhita.
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Independent Thought v. Union of India
Supreme Court of India · 11 October, 2017 · still good law
Held. On 11 October 2017 the Supreme Court read down Exception 2 to Section 375 IPC so that sexual intercourse or sexual acts by a man with his own wife, the wife not being under eighteen years of age, is not rape. Sexual intercourse with a wife aged 15 to 18 is therefore rape. Gupta J, in a separate concurring judgment, added that the judgment has prospective effect, and the Court left the marital rape of adult women undecided.
What changed. The marital exception no longer protects a husband whose wife is under 18, which brings Section 375 into line with the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012. The Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, which repealed the IPC and came into force on 1 July 2024, carries the age of eighteen in Exception 2 to its Section 63.
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Bachpan Bachao Andolan v. Union of India
Supreme Court of India · 18 April, 2011 · still good law
Held. A two-judge bench, in a public interest petition about children trafficked into circuses, directed the Central Government to issue notifications within two months prohibiting the employment of children in circuses and directed the respondents to conduct simultaneous raids on all circuses to liberate children. Rescued children were to be kept in Care and Protective Homes until 18, or returned to willing parents after verification, and the respondents were to frame a rehabilitation scheme and file a compliance affidavit within ten weeks.
What changed. The order requires a ban on children working in circuses, raids to rescue them, placement or verified return home, and a rehabilitation scheme. The Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Amendment Act, 2016, in force from 1 September 2016, renamed the 1986 Act the Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act and made its object the prohibition of engaging children in all occupations, so the circus direction sits inside a wider statute.
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M.C. Mehta v. State of Tamil Nadu
Supreme Court of India · 10 December, 1996 · later modified
Held. A three-judge bench directed that an employer who employs a child in contravention of the Child Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986 pay Rs 20,000 for each child into a Child Labour Rehabilitation-cum-Welfare Fund, with the appropriate Government adding Rs 5,000 where no adult in the family is given a job. The income of the fund goes to the child's family while the child is sent for education, and the Court directed a survey of hazardous employment by the States, assured education on withdrawal, and for non-hazardous jobs a limit of four to six hours a day with two hours of education paid for by the employer.
What changed. Under the 1986 Act as amended in 2016, no child (a person under fourteen) may be employed or permitted to work in any occupation or process, with the exceptions in section 3(2) such as helping a family enterprise after school hours. Section 14B creates a Child and Adolescent Labour Rehabilitation Fund credited with the fine realised from the employer and Rs 15,000 from the appropriate Government for each child or adolescent. The Rs 20,000 employer payment and Rs 5,000 Government contribution directed in this case are not the figures in the Act.
Later modified. The Child and Adolescent Labour (Prohibition and Regulation) Act, 1986, as amended in 2016, now has its own rehabilitation fund (section 14B), credited with fines from employers and a Government payment of Rs 15,000 per child.
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