A plain-English guide to the Right to Information Act, 2005: an advocacy tool your organisation can use, and a transparency law that may apply to it.
Section 01
A law the social sector built
The RTI Act, 2005 grew out of grassroots campaigning, most famously the Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan's jan sunwais (public hearings) in Rajasthan, where muster rolls (attendance and wage records for public works) were read out in public to expose wage fraud. It converted a slogan, hamara paisa, hamara hisab, into an enforceable right to inspect, copy and question government records.
For development organisations the Act cuts both ways. It is the cheapest, most reliable evidence-gathering tool available for advocacy: entitlement delivery, budget utilisation, scheme implementation, environmental clearances. And, less comfortably, NGOs that are "substantially financed" by government funds can themselves be public authorities, and must then answer RTI applications about their own records.
Section 05
Grey areas practitioners argue about
When is an NGO "substantially financed"?
The Act does not define "substantially". In Thalappalam (2013) the Supreme Court said that grants, exemptions and privileges do not by themselves make a body substantially financed unless the funding was so substantial that the body practically runs on it and would struggle to exist without it. In D.A.V. College Trust (17 September 2019) the Court held that "substantial" means a large portion and need not be a majority. It treated land given free or at a heavy discount as capable of being substantial financing, and said that another test is whether the body can carry on its activities effectively without government finance. The Court also said the question is one of fact in each case. A small NGO with capital of Rs 10,000 that gets a grant of Rs 5,000 is not substantially financed, while a body that gets hundreds of crores of rupees can be, even if that is under half of its funds. If government grants or land are a large part of your organisation's resources, assume you may be covered and keep your records in order.
Privacy vs. transparency after Puttaswamy and the DPDP Act
Section 8(1)(j) exempts personal information. Before 13 November 2025 it exempted only personal information whose disclosure had no relationship to any public activity or interest, or would cause an unwarranted invasion of privacy, and even then the PIO or the appellate authority could order disclosure if satisfied that the larger public interest justified it. A proviso said that information which cannot be denied to Parliament or a State Legislature cannot be denied to any person. Section 44(3) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 substituted for the whole clause the words "information which relates to personal information". The Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology brought section 44(3) into force by a notification dated 13 November 2025, the day the notification was published in the Gazette. The public-interest test and the proviso are no longer in the clause. Section 8(2) was not amended. It says an authority "may" allow access where the public interest in disclosure outweighs the harm, so it leaves the decision to the authority. The amendment is challenged in the Supreme Court in Venkatesh Nayak v. Union of India (W.P.(C) 177 of 2026) and connected petitions. On 16 February 2026 the Court issued notice, refused an interim stay and directed that the matter go before a larger bench. On 7 August 2026 a bench of Chief Justice Surya Kant and Justices Joymalya Bagchi and V. Mohana heard the petitioners, and the Solicitor General said the Union would file its reply within two weeks. The challenge is pending. The Court has not stayed section 44(3), so the amended clause applies. Beneficiary lists, which social audits depend on, sit in this tension between public accountability on one side and the personal details of poor households on the other. Frame requests around schemes, sanction orders and totals, and expect an authority to cite clause (j) against any request for named individuals.
Commission vacancies and delay
A right is worth what its enforcement machinery makes of it. Information Commissions have run with long vacancies and multi-year backlogs in several states, and the Right to Information (Amendment) Act, 2019 let the central government prescribe the tenure, salaries and allowances of Information Commissioners, which used to be fixed in the Act. Allow realistic timelines in campaign design, because the cycle of filing, appealing and waiting can outlast a project.
"Information not held in this office"
A PIO whose authority does not hold the information must transfer the application to the right authority as soon as practicable and in any case within 5 days (section 6(3)), and tell the applicant. The PIO may not simply reject it. Information held by a contractor or implementing agency for an authority may still be "held by or under the control of" that authority (section 2(j)). Push back on lazy transfers and denials.
Judgments that shaped this law
The judgments below are the ones that changed what this law requires in practice. Summaries are editorial orientation, not legal advice; the linked judgment is what is authoritative.
CPIO, Supreme Court of India v. Subhash Chandra Agarwal
Supreme Court of India · 13 November, 2019 · still good law
Held. A five-judge Bench held that the Supreme Court of India, which includes the office of the Chief Justice, is a public authority under the RTI Act. It held that the fiduciary relationship exemption in Section 8(1)(e) does not apply to judges' asset declarations, and that where the contents of declarations are sought the public interest test under Section 8(1)(j) and the proviso to Section 11(1) applies. It partly allowed the two other appeals and remitted them to the CPIO to decide after notice to third parties, and said independence of the judiciary is a matter of public interest.
What changed. A request to the Supreme Court registry for information on judges' asset declarations is dealt with under the RTI Act, with notice to third parties where Section 11(1) applies. Section 44(3) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act 2023 substituted Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act with "information which relates to personal information;", and came into force on 13 November 2025. The substituted clause does not contain the public interest test that this judgment applied under Section 8(1)(j).
Read the judgment
DAV College Trust and Management Society v. Director of Public Instructions
Supreme Court of India · 2019 · still good law
Held. The Supreme Court held that a non-governmental organisation substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by the appropriate Government is a public authority under section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act 2005. It held that 'substantial' means a large portion and need not be a majority, that no hard and fast rule applies and the question is one of fact in each case, and that a relevant test is whether the body could carry on its activities effectively without Government finance. It held the DAV colleges and school in Chandigarh to be public authorities and remitted the other appeals to the High Court to decide whether those bodies were substantially financed.
What changed. An NGO that receives government grants, or benefits such as land at a concessionary price, can be treated as a public authority once the finance is substantial in the Court's sense. The DAV institutions received grants of about 40 to 44 per cent of expenditure and 95 per cent of staff salaries. An organisation whose grant income is a large share of its budget, or which could not carry on without it, can expect RTI applications, and the answer is decided on its own facts.
Read the judgment
Reserve Bank of India v. Jayantilal N. Mistry
Supreme Court of India · 16 December, 2015 · still good law
Held. On 16 December 2015 the Supreme Court dismissed the transferred cases brought by the Reserve Bank of India and several banks and left in place the Central Information Commission's orders to disclose inspection reports and related information. It held that the RBI is not in any fiduciary relationship with any bank, so that Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act does not exempt the information, and that the RBI is duty bound to comply with the Act and disclose the information sought.
What changed. A regulator holding inspection reports and statements obtained from the banks it supervises cannot refuse them under Section 8(1)(e) of the RTI Act on the ground that it holds them in a fiduciary capacity. The Court later directed the RBI to withdraw the exemptions in its disclosure policy that were contrary to the judgment (Girish Mittal v. Parvati V. Sundaram, 26 April 2019), and on 28 April 2021 dismissed the banks' applications to recall the 2015 judgment as not maintainable, saying it was not dealing with the correctness of the judgment.
Read the judgment
Thalappalam Service Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. State of Kerala
Supreme Court of India · 7 October, 2013 · still good law
Held. The Court held that cooperative societies registered under the Kerala Co-operative Societies Act are not 'public authorities' under section 2(h) of the Right to Information Act merely because the Registrar regulates them, and quashed the Registrar's circular of 1 June 2006 and the State Government letter of 5 May 2006 to that extent. A body is covered under section 2(h)(d)(i) only if it is owned, controlled or substantially financed by the appropriate Government. Grants, subsidies and exemptions do not amount to substantial financing unless the body practically runs on that funding. An NGO is covered under section 2(h)(d)(ii) if it is substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by Government funds, which may be a question of fact for the Information Commission.
What changed. Whether an organisation must answer RTI applications depends on how much of its funding comes from government and on whether it is owned or controlled by government. The burden of showing this is on the applicant or the appropriate Government (paragraph 40), and the body is free to show that it is not covered. Paragraph 38 gives private educational institutions getting ninety five per cent grant-in-aid as bodies that may be covered, and says general schemes of assistance to a sector do not make a body substantially financed.
Read the judgment
Girish Ramchandra Deshpande v. Central Information Commissioner
Supreme Court of India · 3 October, 2012 · later modified
Held. A two-judge bench dismissed a special leave petition and agreed with the Central Information Commission that copies of memos, show cause notices and orders of censure or punishment issued to a public servant are 'personal information' under Section 8(1)(j) of the RTI Act, because an employee's performance is primarily a matter between employee and employer. It held the same for details in income tax returns, unless the information officer or appellate authority is satisfied that a larger public interest justifies disclosure. The petitioner had not shown a bona fide public interest.
What changed. A request for one official's disciplinary papers or tax details could be refused under Section 8(1)(j) unless a larger public interest was shown. Section 44(3) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 has since replaced clause (j) with the words 'information which relates to personal information;', so the wording this judgment applied is no longer the text of Section 8(1)(j).
Later modified. Section 44(3) of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act, 2023 substituted a new clause (j) in Section 8(1) of the RTI Act, and notification G.S.R. 843(E) brought section 44(3) into force.
Read the judgment
Central Board of Secondary Education v. Aditya Bandopadhyay
Supreme Court of India · 2011 · still good law
Held. The Supreme Court held that an examining body does not hold evaluated answer books in a fiduciary relationship, so the exemption in section 8(1)(e) of the Right to Information Act 2005 is not available to it for them. An examinee can therefore inspect their evaluated answer books or take certified copies. The Court allowed safeguards. Portions that identify examiners are to be severed, and the right lasts only as long as the examining body is expected to retain the answer books.
What changed. An examinee can use the Act to see how their own paper was marked, even where the examining body's rules bar inspection, because section 22 gives the Act overriding effect. The Court treated the examiner, and not the examining body, as the fiduciary while the book is with the examiner for evaluation, which is why the examiner's identity is severed.
Read the judgment
See the full Development Law Docket →